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THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND NUTRALOAF: A 
RECIPE FOR DISASTER 
Alexander J. Spanos∗ 
And if, from malice to an individual, or vindictive feeling, or a disposition to 
oppress, he inflicted punishment beyond that which, in his sober judgment, 
he would have thought necessary, he is liable to this action.1 
I. OVERVIEW 
In the Spring of 2012, in Prude v. Clarke, Judge Richard A. Posner ruled 
that an inmate’s exclusive diet of “nutriloaf,” (also spelled nutraloaf) a foul-
tasting food given to prisoners as a form of punishment, violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.2  The facts 
show that the inmate weighed 168 pounds prior to a ten-day stay awaiting 
trial.3  However, over several different stays at a correctional facility this 
particular inmate lost 8.3 percent of his body weight after being subjected 
exclusively to nutraloaf meals (a.k.a. “prison meat loaf”), which is 
purposefully distributed to curb unwanted behavior of certain inmates, 
including for those found spitting, misusing utensils, throwing of projectiles 
and other bodily wastes at guards, and he was down to 154 pounds by the 
end of a ten-day period.4  This particular inmate’s symptoms included severe 
vomiting and bloody stools, and he also developed a painful anal fissure 
upon his return to state prison.5   During one visit to the county jail 
infirmary, a nurse described his weight loss as “alarming.”6 
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 1. Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. 390, 404, 13 L. Ed. 1036 (1851) (noting, in dicta, 
the permissible bounds that a commanding officer must remain within while dealing with 
a subordinate and punishment).  Although Dinsman did not include an Eighth 
Amendment assertion of cruel and unusual punishment, this statement represents an early 
Supreme Court ruling where justices were concerned with the subjective intent of an 
authority figure in charge. 
 2. Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied (Apr. 19, 2012). 
 3. Id. at 733. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 734. 
 6. Id. 
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The primary goal of this note is to address the rationale behind arguments 
that serving nutraloaf to inmates throughout the United States constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment.  The second section of this note introduces 
the evolution of cruel and unusual punishment claims in the context of the 
Eighth Amendment, owing particular thanks to the scholarship of Michael 
B. Mushlin on the topic.  In particular, section two focuses on three key 
Supreme Court decisions that sought to harmonize what the standard of 
analysis for cruel and unusual punishment claims would be.  Next, section 
three examines the complex relationship between food and prisoners by 
touching on the various power struggles that exist between subordinate 
inmates and authority figures.  Subsequently, the fourth section of this note 
provides a cross-section of judicial opinions on cruel and unusual 
punishment cases to better highlight the range of claims inmates typically 
raise while incarcerated. Part five of this note exclusively deals with inmate 
challenges that involve food. Similarly, part six of this note solely focuses 
on judicial decisions involving prisoners and nutraloaf, with the main 
emphasis on Prude v. Clarke and its critique.  Finally, in conclusion, this 
note attempts to synthesize the lessons of past cruel and unusual punishment 
cases regarding serving nutraloaf to prisoners, and concluding that so long as 
prisoners are being served a nutritionally sufficient meal, an inmates’ 
personal qualms with nutraloaf’s taste or appeal is irrelevant. Conditions of 
confinement are not meant to be easy or tailored to individual preferences of 
inmates, and the best way to avoid an unpleasant or foul-tasting meal is the 
refrain from the kinds of food infractions that result in the distribution of 
nutraloaf in the first place. 
II. UNDERSTANDING CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
A. Evolution of Eighth Amendment Protections 
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to 
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, articulates subtle, yet 
necessary protections for current prisoners.7  Among other things, the Eighth 
Amendment guarantees that no “cruel and unusual punishments [shall be] 
inflicted.”8  Historically, the desire to prevent cruel and unusual punishment 
stemmed from concern over arbitrary and egregious judgments during James 
	  
 7. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962 (1991) (citing Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660 (1962)). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
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II’s reign in England.9  The prohibition appeared initially in the Bill of 
Rights of 1689.10 
Prior to 1976, the United States Supreme Court seldom addressed the 
scope of the Eight Amendment’s protections regarding inmates and prison 
conditions.11  During that time, Eighth Amendment cases were granted 
certiorari only in situations where sentences were grossly disproportionate to 
crimes.12  However, a shift occurred between 1976 and 1994, when the 
Supreme Court decided seven cases that dealt with prisoner rights and prison 
conditions rather than sentencing challenges.13 
	  
 9. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967-68 (“Most historians agree that the ‘cruel[] and 
unusual[] punishments’ provision of the English Declaration of Rights was prompted by 
the abuses attributed to the infamous Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys of the King’s Bench 
during the Stuart reign of James II . . . . [R]ecently historians have argued, and the best 
historical evidence suggests, that it was not Jeffreys’ management of the Bloody Assizes 
that led to the Declaration of Rights provision, but rather the arbitrary sentencing power 
he had exercised in administering justice from the King’s Bench.”). 
 10. What Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 24 HARV. L. REV. 54, 54-55 (1910); see 
also MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 638-46 (noting the use of a pillory, a wooden 
device where a prisoner’s head and limbs were inserted and secured in place, so as to 
induce public humiliation from a passerby); but compare Anthony F. Granucci, Nor 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 
851 (1969) (arguing that the American framers misinterpreted the intent of the English 
Bill of Rights drafters, and also suggesting, inter alia, that in 1641 a Puritan attorney, 
Rev. Nathaniel Ward of Ipswich, Massachusetts, drafted a document under the title Body 
of Liberties). With respect to Rev. Ward’s Body of Liberties, clause 46 said the following: 
“For bodily punishments we allow amongst us none that are inhumane, barbarous or 
cruel.” Id. at 851. 
 11. Michael B. Mushlin, Chapter 3: The Eighth Amendment: Solitary Confinement, 
Prevention of Violence, Protection Against Overcrowding, and Provisions of The 
Necessities of Life in RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 69 (Thompson/West 4th ed., 2009). 
 12. Id.; see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (striking down 
minimum imprisonment of 12 years, one day in chains and lifetime surveillance for a 
crime of falsifying an official document); but see In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 
(1890) (discussing the extent of constitutional limitations of cruel and unusual 
punishments by suggesting, “[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a 
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word 
as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,-something 
more than the mere extinguishment of life.”). 
 13. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 69. See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 
(1976); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 
(1986); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); 
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 509 U.S. 25 (1993). 
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In 1976, Estelle v. Gamble marked the first Supreme Court case 
specifically addressing the Eight Amendment’s protections from cruel and 
unusual punishment with respect to an inmate’s health conditions.14  In 
Estelle, a Texas state prisoner filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights 
complaint15 alleging, inter alia, that a medical director and two corrections 
officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment when they failed to 
provide adequate treatment for a back injury he allegedly sustained while 
engaged in a prison-work assignment.16  The majority opinion in Estelle 
reinforced a rather common-sense notion that “infliction of such unnecessary 
suffering [upon inmates] is inconsistent with contemporary standards of 
decency.”17  However, Estelle ultimately stood for the proposition that in 
order for a prisoner to state a cognizable claim, “a prisoner must allege acts 
or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs.”18  While the Estelle decision first introduced the 
term “deliberate indifference” into the Eighth Amendment conversation, the 
Court did not make efforts to truly define the term’s meaning.19 
The next Supreme Court decision addressing Eighth Amendment 
protections regarding prison conditions occurred five years later, in Rhodes 
v. Chapman. 20   Rhodes involved a claim by two prisoners held at a 
maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio, who alleged the prison’s 
	  
 14. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (“An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his 
medical needs. . . . In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce physical 
[torture or death. . . . In less serious cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and 
suffering which no one would suggest would serve any penological purpose.”). 
 15. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a 
source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights 
elsewhere conferred.’” (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). 
 16. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106-07 (finding that no “deliberate indifference” occurred 
when an inmate’s medical treatment consisted of approximately seventeen visits with 
medical personnel over a three month span). 
 17. Id. at 103. See also id. at 103 n.8 (referencing more than twenty State codes 
dealing with the treatment of prisoners or rules for the operation correctional facilities. In 
addition, noting that “[m]any states have also adopted regulations which specify, in 
varying degrees of detail, the standards of medical care to be provided to prisoners.”). See 
also Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926) (articulating the common-law 
view of prisoners that “the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot, by 
reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.”). 
 18. 429 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added). 
 19. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 70, 70 n.3 (“The term [deliberate indifference] had not 
been used by the Supreme Court prior to Estelle.”). 
 20. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
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policy of “double celling” constituted cruel and unusual punishment.21  
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell wrote that the “gravamen of their 
complaint was that double celling confined inmates too closely.”22  But here, 
the Rhodes Court found that prison conditions, even those that some may 
consider harsh, are merely a consequence of the debt that criminal offenders 
pay for offenses against society.23  Justice Powell also famously stated, “the 
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” and he noted that 
maximum-security prison conditions “cannot be free of discomfort.” 24  
Ultimately, the Rhodes Court held that any double-celling was necessitated 
by an unforeseen surge in the prison population, and any effects on inmates 
were negligible at best and “did not lead to deprivations of essential food, 
medical care, or sanitation.”25 
With respect to the evolution of Eighth Amendment analysis on cruel and 
unusual punishment, Rhodes had a significant impact insofar as the Court 
specifically declined to focus on the prison officials’ subjective states of 
mind, and instead looked to an objective inquiry into the prison conditions in 
question.26  However, this alternate approach put Rhodes and Estelle slightly 
at odds, as a deliberate indifference standard articulated in Estelle 
“require[d] some inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind.”27 
	  
 21. Id. at 339-40 (explaining that double celling is a policy where two prisoners are 
put in cells typically designed for one due to overpopulation). See also Chapdelaine v. 
Keller, No. 95-CV-1126, 1998 WL 357350, at *4-5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1998) (finding no 
Eighth Amendment violation for a double-celling policy despite inmates’ complaints 
about cell crowding, inadequate ventilation, no ladder access to the top bunk, and no 
private sanitary facilities). 
 22. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 340-41 (“Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 
square feet. Each contains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinet-type night stand, a 
wall-mounted sink with hot and cold running water, and a toilet that the inmate can flush 
from inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered bunk bed.”). 
 23. Id. at 347. 
 24. Id. at 349. 
 25. Id. at 348 (“Although job and educational opportunities diminished marginally as 
a result of double celling, limited work hours and delay before receiving education do not 
inflict pain . . . [w]e would have to wrench the Eighth Amendment from its language and 
history to hold that delay of these desirable aids to rehabilitation violates the 
Constitution.”). 
 26. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 72 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)). 
 27. Id. at 73. But see Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (“Eighth 
Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of 
individual Justices; judgments should be informed by objective factors to the maximum 
possible extent.”) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)). 
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Five years later, in Whitley v. Albers, the Supreme Court addressed an 
action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate who was shot in the leg 
by a prison guard that was attempting to free another officer held hostage 
during a prison riot.28  The Whitley Court rejected the inmate’s claim that the 
shooting violated the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishments by focusing on the pressing exigent circumstances that 
the guards faced during the riot.29  The Court concluded that, for an inmate 
to prevail, he or she must show that the shooting occurred “maliciously and 
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”30  In other words, the 
Whitley Court focused on the subjective element of how force was applied—
and whether or not the force was applied in a “good faith effort to maintain 
or restore discipline.”31 
At this point, the Court had articulated three distinct tests for Eighth 
Amendment challenges regarding cruel and unusual punishment, causing a 
lack of consensus 32   Where Estelle initially articulated a deliberate 
indifference standard, and Rhodes highlighted the importance of objectivity, 
the Whitley decision represented a shift towards subjectivity.33  The Whitley 
Court expressed concern that a deliberate indifference standard might not 
adequately “capture the importance” of competing factors such as the mental 
state of prison officials.34   Until 1991, no definitive test was in place that 
one might look to in determining the constitutionality of cruel and unusual 
punishment claims. 
B. Harmonizing Estelle, Rhodes, and Whitley 
In 1991, the Court attempted to “rationalize and harmonize” its previous 
decisions in Estelle, Rhodes, and Whitley with respect to the Eighth 
Amendment and prison conditions in Wilson v. Seiter.35  Wilson involved a 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit from an Ohio inmate who alleged that certain 
	  
 28. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). 
 29. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 73-74 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) 
(“It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize 
the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”). 
 30. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 313. 
 31. Id. at 320-21 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). 
 32. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 74. 
 33. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. 
 34. Id. (noting that relevant factors should be considered in a subjective analysis of 
the action undertaken by prison officials, such as the need for any application of force as 
well as the relationship between the need and amount of force utilized). 
 35. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 76 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)). 
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conditions of his incarceration amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, 
including, but not limited to, complaints about excessive noise, deficient 
locker space, unhygienic dining services and food preparation, and unclean 
restrooms.36  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, focused on the text of 
the Eighth Amendment which “bans only cruel and unusual punishment,” 
and reasoned that any punishment not formally enumerated through a 
judge’s sentence requires a subjective analysis into an inflicting officer’s 
state of mind.37  On this specific point, Justice Scalia quoted the following 
observations made by Judge Posner in Duckworth v. Franzen: 
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise 
or deter. This is what the word means today; it is what it meant in 
the eighteenth century. . . . [I]f [a] guard accidentally stepped on 
[a] prisoner’s toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in 
anything remotely like the accepted meaning of the word, whether 
we consult the usage of 1791, or 1868, or 1985.38 
However, the Wilson Court concluded that all Eighth Amendment prison 
claims must both be “supported by proof of an objective and a subjective 
component.”39  In other words, plaintiffs must not only meet a burden of 
establishing that prison conditions are objectively cruel and unusual, but 
additionally satisfy that those conditions stem from subjective, “culpable 
acts by agents of the state.”40 
C. The Objective and Subjective Test 
As set forth in Trop v. Dulles, the Eighth Amendment’s meaning is rooted 
in the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”41  Thus, what may have been recognized as permissible decades or 
	  
 36. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296 (1991). 
 37. Id. at 300-01. 
 38. Id. at 300 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986) (rejecting allegations of cruel and unusual punishment 
stemming from a 1979 fire aboard a bus carrying handcuffed prisoners between Illinois 
prisons). The doors of the bus were sealed for security purposes and dense smoke filled 
the bus. Twenty one inmates were injured, and one inmate died. Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 
648. 
 39. Mushlin, supra, note 11 at 76 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)) 
(emphasis added). 
 40. Id. at 78 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). 
 41. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
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centuries earlier, may not necessarily be morally or legally tolerable in 
modern times.42 
In a post-Wilson era, two tests were available for an inquiry regarding a 
prisoner’s Eighth Amendment challenge—one subjective and one 
objective.43  With respect to the objective prong, the question at issue 
became whether or not a condition was so serious that it might require 
protection or relief; whereas the subjective prong looked to whether or not 
prison administrators and officials had a culpable mindset in their decisions 
that punished or affected inmates.44  Because these tests are independent of 
each other, a reviewing court could apply them in whatever order or 
preference desired.45 
Frequently, objective standards of decency refer back to model standards 
proposed by organizations such as the American Bar Association, American 
Law Institute, and National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals.46  While for the most part lower courts rely on these 
standards47 in assessing standards of decency, the Supreme Court tends to 
view the wisdom of such groups or agencies as merely relevant, rather than 
as controlling. 
It terms of the subjective prong, the Supreme Court set forth in Wilson 
that there must be an inquiry into the state of mind for the prison guard or 
administrator responsible for the conduct at issue in an Eighth Amendment 
prisoner claim.48  To constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the practice in 
	  
 42. Roderick Oxford, Eighth Amendment ETS Claims: A Matter of Human Dignity, 
18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 505, 519 (1993) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 329 
(1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)); see also Mushlin, supra, note 11 at 92 n.7 (quoting 
Judge Posner’s opinion, from Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1315 (7th Cir. 
1988), where he wrote, “[t]he conditions in which prisoners are housed, like the poverty 
line, is a function of a society’s standard of living. As that standard rises, the standard of 
minimum decency of prison conditions, like the poverty line, rises too.”). 
 43. Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and Prisoner 
Interests in Determining What Is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 1815-
16 (2012). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Oxford, supra note 42, at 529. 
 46. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 94 (discussing model standards proposed by various 
organizations). 
 47. See e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 567 n.10 (10th Cir. 1980) (articulating 
the Supreme Court’s view of minimum standards of decency by arguing “[w]hile . . . a 
variance from state standards or from standards promulgated by certain professional 
organizations does not establish a per se constitutional violation, it is a factor to be 
considered in determining whether contemporary standards of decency have been met.”). 
 48. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301 (1991). 
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question must necessarily be characterized as some form of punishment, 
otherwise there is no constitutional prohibition against it.49  If a claim 
involves brutality by guards, “the inmate must prove that the defendants 
acted with malice,” if, however,  “the claim concerns a prison condition, the 
right to safety and protection from inmate assaults, or prison medical care, 
the lesser standard of ‘deliberate indifference’ . . . applies.”50  Overall, “no 
matter how objectively deplorable” a prison condition is, said condition 
might only be found unconstitutional if it “was imposed with the requisite 
scienter by prison officials.”51 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRISON FOOD 
A. Food in General 
The Eighth Amendment is a safeguard against subhuman conditions for 
incarcerated individuals.52  Once the government imprisons someone, it 
assumes the responsibility of protecting his or her well-being during that 
period of incarceration.53 As the only source for food for prisoners, the state 
must ensure that all prisoners are provided with “nutritionally adequate food 
that is prepared and served under conditions which do not present an 
immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates who consume 
it.”54  
Historically, food was tied closely to a system of rewards or 
punishments—mainly as a tool to foster obedience. 55   Throughout the 
nineteenth century, “incoming prisoners were provided typically with bread 
and water until they had earned the right for such luxuries as meat or 
cheese.”56  However, in the twentieth century, during the rise of the medical 
	  
 49. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 98. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 98-99. 
 52. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (“The  also imposes duties on these 
officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must 
ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. . . .”). 
 53. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (“When a person is 
institutionalized—and wholly dependent on the State . . . a duty to provide certain 
services and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily has considerable 
discretion in determining the nature and scope of its responsibilities.”). 
 54. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 571 (10th Cir. 1980). 
 55. MARY BOSWORTH, THE U.S. FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM 73-77 (2002). 
 56. Id. at 73. 
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model of rehabilitation, 57  “individualized treatment” based on “the 
positivistic beliefs . . . in the potential of science” gained favor.58  This 
medical-based model helped shift the focus away from obedience and 
towards “scientific notions of nutrition.”59  Consequently, the mainstream 
belief was that “[h]ealthy prisoners . . . would be productive workers and, 
ultimately, reformed citizens.”60   
In more modern times, prison standards have improved somewhat, yet, 
unsurprisingly, limited finances restrict most correctional facilities. In fact, 
some institutions manage with a total operational budget amounting to less 
than $3.00 a day per inmate.61  With such limited funds, it should come as 
no surprise that prisoners are often dissatisfied with the food provided.62 
At a minimum, prisoners are allotted no less than fifteen minutes to eat 
their meals.63   Most correctional standards also require that food be served 
in “congregate settings” except when security reasons override.64   Former 
pleasantries from life outside of jail are not always provided or even 
constitutionally protected.65  For example, there is no constitutional right to 
coffee.66  However, with respect to inmates’ nutritional concerns, some 
institutions do make a point of offering healthier options of that day’s “main 
meal, and even go so far as to provide a salad bar.”67 
	  
 57. Dean J. Spader, Megatrends in Criminal Justice Theory, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157, 
180 (1986). 
 58. Id. 
 59. BOSWORTH, supra note 55, at 73 (“Prison diets were examined for the calorific 
content rather than used primarily as a means of control.”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 74 (“As Seth M. Ferranti points out, ‘Whenever you have inmates making 
the food and they don’t care, the food will suck. . . . It all depends on the given 
situation.”). 
 63. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 271.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Lane v. Hutcheson, 794 F. Supp. 877, 884 (E.D. Mont. 1992).  The court noted 
that “discomfort alone” is not a constitutional violation.  In Lane, the inmate complained, 
inter alia, about poor ventilation which resulted in hot prison conditions, lack of access to 
fresh fruits and vegetables, and no access to a glass mirror.  Id. 
 66. Id. at 882-83 (“Unlike life outside of the jail, inmates are not allowed to “raid the 
refrigerator” thereby having unlimited access to food. This is simply one of life’s 
pleasures that confinement must restrict for safety and security reasons.”). 
 67. BOSWORTH, supra note 55, at 73-77 (“Most prisons these days also have a salad 
bar and offer a ‘hearty healthy’ version of the main meal. Fried chicken and baked 
chicken, or French fries and baked potatoes may be served at the same meal.”). 
232 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXX:1 
B. Power Struggles & Inmate Defiance 
In correctional institutions, food generally symbolizes “the complexity of 
power relations between inmates and staff.”68  Decisions about food are just 
one aspect of control that inmates lose upon incarceration.  The stark 
contrast is that “in outside society dietary habits serve to establish and 
symbolize control over one’s body . . . [but] [i]n prison, that control is taken 
away as the prisoner and their [sic] body become the objects of external 
forces.”69  Although each prisoner eventually adapts to the restrictions of 
incarceration, some inmates frequently challenge their subordinate roles by 
acting out in visibly defiant ways against the authority figures.70  While 
some inmates show their defiance by refusing to return trays, others resort to 
more drastic means by hurling a mixture of food and human waste at 
guards.71  
Aside from regularly scheduled meals, “[p]rison canteens can offer 
prisoners some avenues for accessing foods that they crave or associate with 
home or their cultural heritage.”72 However, such choices are limited to 
those more powerful “inmates who possess the wealth—in whatever form of 
currency—to buy.” 73  Interestingly, these outside choices can present 
additional problems for correctional guards, since the food and its packaging 
can at times be used for contraband concealment.74  For example, “Kit Kat 
chocolate bars . . . can be purchased at many prison canteens.  But because 
the silver foil the Kit Kats are wrapped in can be used for taking drugs, the 
bars are stockpiled and traded at exorbitantly high rates.”75  Similarly, 
“[f]ruit bought at the canteen or taken from the mess halls can be illegally 
	  
 68. Avi Brisman, Fair Fare?: Food As Contested Terrain in U.S. Prisons and Jails, 
15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 49, 54 (2008) (citing Gill Valentine & Beth 
Longstaff, Doing Porridge: Food and Social Relations in a Male Prison, 3 J. MATERIAL 
CULTURE 131, 132 (1998)). 
 69. Brisman, supra note 68 at, 54 (citing Catrin Smith, Punishment and Pleasure: 
Women, Food and the Imprisoned Body, 50 A.M. SOC. REV. 197, 202 (2002)). 
 70. Brisman, supra note 68, at 73 (citing Rebecca Godderis, Dining In: The Symbolic 
Power of Food in Prison, 43 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 255, 260 (2006)). 
 71. Brisman, supra note 68, at 74 (stating that typically, a mixture of urine and feces 
is thrown at the eyes and face of guards. “Humiliation is the name of the game and is one 
of the few ways prisoners have to degrade their keepers”)(quoting CARL SIFKIS, THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 238 (2003)). 
 72. Brisman, supra note 68, at 76. 
 73. Id. at 77. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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turned into alcohol, called ‘pruno,’ which can be traded, sold or 
consumed.”76 
Hunger strikes are another common form of prisoner defiance. 77 
According to the Code of Federal Regulations on Judicial Administration, a 
hunger strike is defined officially as a prisoner who “communicates that fact 
to staff and is observed by staff to be refraining from eating for a period of 
time, ordinarily in excess of 72 hours.”78 This self-starving behavior is 
usually done to effectuate change.79  Most interesting is the dual-effect that 
hunger strikes may have by highlighting how well officials do (or do not) 
respond.  On one hand, by permitting a hunger strike the State may appear to 
devalue prisoners’ lives.80  However, the alternative would be to intervene 
by force-feeding, an effort the prisoner may challenge, which ultimately 
“turns an illegitimate activity—the hunger strike—into a legitimate one.”81 
IV. A CROSS-SECTION OF CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT COMPLAINTS 
A. Shrader v. White 
Every cruel and unusual punishment claim is different in some manner, 
but most if not all, give a unique snapshot into life behind bars.  For 
example, in Shrader v. White, inmates at Virginia State Penitentiary brought 
a class action suit against prison officials stating, inter alia, that “various 
conditions of their confinement violated the eighth amendment’s 
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.”82  Here, the Shrader 
court addressed inmate concerns about prison weapons, showers, inadequate 
heating and ventilation, the general disrepair of prisons, and oddly enough, a 
“pigeon” nest problem. 83   With respect to the pigeon nests, inmates 
expressed concern that the presence of birds might create a health risk, 
particularly from a sanitary point of view, because “pigeon feces and 
pigeons inside of the building increase the opportunity for the occurrence 
and transmission of certain mycotic diseases.”84   On this point, no evidence 
	  
 76. Id. (citing Gill Valentine & Beth Longstaff, Doing Porridge: Food and Social 
Relations in a Male Prison, 3 J. MATERIAL CULTURE 131, 140 (1998)). 
 77. Brisman, supra note 68, at 79. 
 78. Id. at 80 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 549.61 (2005)). 
 79. Brisman, supra note 68, at 77. 
 80. Id. at 88 (citing Lionel Wee, The Hunger Strike as a Communicative Act: 
Intention without Responsibility, 17 J. LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 61, 70 (2007)). 
 81. Brisman, supra note 68, at 88. 
 82. Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 977 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 83. Id. at 975-84. 
 84. Id. at 984. 
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was ever introduced that demonstrated if any inmate actually suffered from 
the presence of pigeons.85   With respect to the sanitary conditions of 
showers, the court noted while there were rust stains and possible 
momentary loss of cold water as a result of toilets flushing, there was simply 
no evidence that inmates suffered injury as a result. 86 
On the more pertinent issue of food service in this note, the Shrader case 
reinforced the well-established principle that inmates must receive 
nutritionally adequate food, “prepared and served under conditions which do 
not present an immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates 
who consume it.”87  Here, the parties involved stipulated that when food was 
properly prepared and stored, the menu met the requirements for 
nutritionally adequate meals.88  However, the inmates’ main dispute in 
Shrader was that food was not in fact properly stored, prepared, or served.89 
In its analysis of the food, the court compared the plaintiff-inmates claims 
against the veracity of defense witnesses.90  The court stated, “if one were to 
believe the plaintiffs’ inmate witnesses, rarely a meal is served that does not 
consist of: (1) raw food; (2) rotten food; or (3) contaminated food.”91  On the 
other hand, “[t]he defendants presented evidence of a Four-Star restaurant 
with excellent management procedures.”92  I n this case, the court’s primary 
focus was on making credibility determinations.93   Accordingly, the court 
found that the record “reveals no evidence of outbreaks of food poisoning, 
diarrhea, or other diseases which are indicative of unhealthy conditions in 
the preparation or handling of food.”94  Furthermore, “there is no evidence 
of either malnutrition or ‘sub-clinical manifestations’ of malnutrition, such 
as increased dental problems, loss of appetite, reduced capacity to work, 
ward off disease, cope with stress, etc.”95  
Overall, the Shrader case serves as an important data point for cruel and 
unusual punishment claims, as the opinion arguably articulated the correct 
position that judicial assessment of prison conditions “spring[s] from 
constitutional requirements” rather than from a “court’s [particular] idea of 
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how to best operate a detention facility.”96  In other words, judges should not 
subjectively dictate or speculate on how prisons might best operate, or 
selectively impose standards.97  Likewise, the Shrader court also emphasized 
the harsh reality first articulated in Rhodes v. Chapman, that “the 
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . cannot 
be free of discomfort.”98  Ultimately, the Shrader court affirmed the district 
court’s findings that the prisoners’ claims lacked substance to prove Eighth 
Amendment violations on the part of prison officials.99 
B. Walker v. Johnson 
In Walker v. Johnson, a prisoner claimed that his constitutional rights 
were violated during an emergency lockdown of the prison for security 
reasons.100  Among other grievances, the inmate claimed he was fed cold, 
nutritionally deficient meals, received insufficient medical attention, and had 
no access to fresh air or outdoor exercise.101  Referencing an unpublished 
opinion on similar facts, the Court concluded that the restrictions imposed 
by the prison officials, though harsher than usual, remained constitutional, as 
they were implemented to further legitimate governmental interests in 
preserving order and safety.102 
The decision in Walker represents an all too common response in cruel 
and unusual punishment cases where a prisoner merely asserts a litany of 
claims without offering the requisite support to establish any actual 
violation.103  Here the court’s finding is representative of such a response.  
Where the allegation was that meals were inadequate and cold, the court 
found that inmates need only be provided with nutritionally adequate 
	  
 96. Id. at 986 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981)). 
 97. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (“Eighth Amendment judgments 
should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices; 
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 98. Shrader, 761 F.2d at 987 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). 
    99.  Shrader, 761 F. 2d at 981.  
 100. Johnson v. Williams, 768 F. Supp. 1161, 1163 (E.D. Va. 1991). According to 
Virginia Department of Corrections guidelines, an institutional lockup exists as a security 
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 101. Johnson 768 F. Supp. at 1163. 
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food.104  The court reasoned that a cold bag lunch provided in lieu of a hot 
meal is not inherently less nutritious or unsanitary than a hot meal.105  
Similarly, with respect to the claim of inadequate medical attention, the 
court found that the inmate failed to establish any hard evidence of 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.106  Finally, the claims about 
excessive heat and cold failed because the inmate did not provide concrete 
evidence that the conditions resulted in serious medical or emotional 
deterioration.107 
One of the more relevant issues raised in Johnson revolves around the 
question of inmate access to recreation and outdoor exercise.108  As the court 
noted, the Fourth Circuit in Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections 
previously held that a limitation, such as solitary confinement or restriction 
to exercise, that is ongoing for an extended period of time is harmful to 
prisoner health constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.109  However, in 
Johnson the court ruled that based on security reasons for the lockdown, any 
restrictions on the opportunity to exercise outdoors did not violate 
constitutional protections.110  More importantly, the record indicated that 
although opportunities were restricted, prisoners still had limited access 
outside of their cells and were still allowed to leave individual confinement 
approximate two hours every day, and allowed outdoor exercise twice a 
week, negating the prisoners Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual 
punishment.111  Overall, the Court determined that because the decisions 
made were penologically justified, no violation occurred.112 
	  
 104. Id. at  1165 (quoting Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 986 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
 105. Johnson v. Williams, 768 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1991). See also Burgin 
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V. A CROSS-SECTION OF OPINIONS ABOUT FOOD 
A. Hamm v. DeKalb County 
In Hamm v. DeKalb County, a pretrial detainee complained that he was 
incarcerated in DeKalb County Jail from 1979 until 1982 during which time 
“food occasionally contained foreign objects.”113  A district court entered 
judgment for defendants, and the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the district 
court correctly applied the standards with respect to food served to 
inmates.114   Specifically, the Constitution mandates at a minimum that 
“reasonably adequate food” be provided in order for the cruel and unusual 
punishment standard to be passed.115  Going further, “the fact the food 
occasionally contains foreign objects or sometimes is served cold, while 
unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.”116 
B. Rodriguez v. Briley 
In Rodriguez v. Briley, an Illinois state prisoner appealed an earlier 
summary judgment ruling and claimed that prison officials had inflicted 
cruel and unusual punishment by “denying him showers and withholding 
meals.”117   Inmate Rodriguez failed to comply with a prison rule that 
required him to store certain belongings in a particular box, which would 
promote safety, security, and facilitate swift cell searches for guards.118 As a 
consequence for noncompliance, he was not permitted to leave his cell to go 
to the prison cafeteria.  In addition, during an 18-month period, inmate 
Rodriguez “missed 75 showers and between 300 to 350 meals, with various 
consequences that included a rash, fatigue, and a loss of 90 pounds.”119 
The Seventh Circuit ruled that Rodriguez “punished himself” and that as 
soon as “Rodriguez puts his belongings in the storage box, he can leave his 
	  
 113. Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1569 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 114. Id. at 1569. 
 115. Id. at 1575. 
 116. Id. (citing Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598, 601 (1st Cir. 1974)). 
 117. Rodriguez v. Briley, 403 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (The court sarcastically noted, “[n]ot that [inmate Rodriguez] needed those 90 
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cell and go to the cafeteria.”120  In addressing Rodriguez, Judge Posner wrote 
the following: 
Suppose [Rodriguez] announced that he would skip dinner every 
day unless he were served champagne and caviar at least one a 
month. He, not the prison, would be the author of his being denied 
dinner. A prisoner cannot force the prison to change its rules by 
going on a hunger strike and blaming the prison for his resulting 
loss of weight.121 
Judge Posner wisely noted that only certain reasons would justify 
intervening in this case, including if a refusal to eat turned suicidal, or if 
such noncompliance were the product of insanity; however, neither 
condition was a factor here.122 
C. Varricchio v. County of Nassau 
In Varricchio v. County of Nassau, an inmate claimed that he received 
tainted food that consisted of bodily waste, staples, metal pins, and soap, and 
that as a result of unbearable pains and bloody stools, the he went on a 
hunger strike.123 The court denied the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment because the inmate’s complaint raised sufficient facts to plead a 
claim of cruel and unusual punishment.124   The court was particularly 
influenced by allegations that sheriffs were placing bets on when the inmate 
would give up his hunger strike and begin eating meals again.125  For the 
Varricchio court, the subjective prong might be satisfied if the sheriffs were 
aware of a serious harm, yet chose to do nothing about it.126  The court also 
noted that the inmate claimed he was brought to the medical department and 
later to a hospital for x-rays, yet the inmate maintained he was never actually 
treated for his problems.127  
Although the underlying merits of the cruel and unusual punishment claim 
were not adjudicated at this stage, the Varricchio example still raises some 
concern over inmate veracity and what might constitute sufficient proof of 
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fact.  In its analysis, the Varricchio court reinforces the common view that 
food served violates the Eighth Amendment if an inmate proves nutritional 
inadequacy or preparation, or the food somehow presents an immediate 
danger to his or her health and well-being.128 However, in this instance, the 
prisoner merely alleged that his food contained staples, metal pins and soap 
without actually articulating anything more than his personal conclusion that 
food was contaminated.129  Assuming arguendo, that even one meal was 
contaminated, the suspicion that subsequent meals would be contaminated 
amounts to a self-imposed hunger strike not based on fact, but rather on 
speculation.  A more important question remains as to how an inmate, with 
limited resources and abilities, might even factually preserve evidence of 
deliberate food contamination, especially if it only occurred once.  If the 
contamination was deliberate or a form of retaliation from guards, in all 
likelihood those very same guard or guards would be able to destroy that 
evidence.  On some level, Varricchio, like Shrader above, reinforces the 
difficult burden that inmates face in preserving evidence, or actually 
supporting allegations in a sufficient manner. 
D. Greene v. Esgrow 
In Greene v. Esgrow, an inmate was placed on a pre-hearing restricted diet 
for seven days as a result of allegations that he spat at a staff member from 
his cell in October 2008.130  After that inmate was found guilty of those 
charges, the inmate was subsequently sentenced to twelve months of 
confinement in the special housing unit, and twenty-one more days of a 
restricted diet.131  The court found nothing in the record to indicate that the 
post-hearing restricted diet was cruel and unusual punishment or in violation 
of New York State regulations for restricted diets. 132  New York State 
regulations require, among other things, that medical staff check on the 
inmate’s health within twenty-four hours of being on the restricted diet, and 
that any physician, nurse, or physician’s assistant shall make a weekly 
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240 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXX:1 
written report regarding the inmate’s condition, or if there is a 
recommendation that the diet should stop.133 
VI. AN ANALYSIS OF NUTRALOAF DECISIONS 
The first issue with nutraloaf is discerning exactly what the food is made 
from.134 As Judge Posner wrote, nutraloaf “isn’t a proprietary food like 
Hostess Twinkies but, like ‘meatloaf’ or ‘beef stew,’ a term for a composite 
food the recipe of which can vary from institution to institution, or even 
from day to day within an institution.” 135   Adding to the confusion, 
“nutraloaf could meet requirements for calories and protein one day yet be 
poisonous the next if, for example, made from leftovers that had spoiled.”136  
According to prison officials, nutraloaf is simply a tool “for behavior 
modification.” 137   While prison officials maintain that nutraloaf is a 
“complete meal,” inmates counter that it is “so awful they’d [sic] rather go 
hungry.”138 
For shooting suspect Christopher Williams, the nutraloaf he was served in 
2008 is typical—it contained “a mixture of cubed whole wheat bread, 
nondairy cheese, raw carrots, spinach, seedless raisins, beans, vegetable oil, 
tomato paste, powdered milk and dehydrated potato flakes.”139 According to 
Vermont Corrections Commissioner Rob Hofmann, nutraloaf is a 
“mechanism that dissuades inmates from throwing feces, urine trays and 
silverware . . . [that] tends to have the desired outcome.”140 Hoffman added, 
“[o]nce the offender relents, we stop with the nutraloaf. That’s our goal, to 
protect our staff.”141 
The real challenge is whether the nutraloaf is, of itself, a form of cruel and 
unusual punishment. Furthermore, there is a question over whether that 
	  
 133. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 304.2. 
 134. Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 732, 733 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied (Apr. 19, 2012) 
(“Nutriloaf (also spelled ‘nutraloaf’) is a bad-tasting food given to prisoners as a form of 
punishment (it is colloquially known as ‘prison loaf’ or ‘disciplinary loaf’”)). 
 135. Id. at 734. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Wilson Ring, Prison Calls It Food, Inmates Disagree, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 
23, 2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/03/23/prison-calls-it-food-
inma_n_92953.html. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. (Christopher Williams, who was 29 in 2008, was “charged in a 2006 school 
shooting that killed two people in Essex[, VT]” and was “given nutraloaf after he had 
assaulted guards and smeared excrement in his cell.”). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
2013] The Eighth Amendment and Nutraloaf 241 
punishment is truly harmful, or alternatively, whether the food (if prepared 
properly) is a nutritious, albeit generally unappetizing, form of sustenance 
for inmates. 
A. Gilcrist v. Kautzky 
One of the earliest references to nutraloaf in a judicial opinion is the 1989 
case of Gilcrist v. Kautzky.142  In Gilcrist, an inmate alleged that prison staff 
used nutraloaf as a form of punishment in direct violation of Washington 
Administrative Code 137-28-110, which explicitly stated that “lowering the 
quantity or quality of food and deprivation of clothing, bedding, bed, or 
normal hygienic implements shall not be used as sanctions.”143   Directing its 
attention to nutraloaf, the Court noted that nutraloaf is “alleged to be an 
unhealthy ground mass of food which looks like dog food.”144   By raising a 
due process challenge instead of a cruel and unusual punishment claim, the 
inmate successfully argued that the state protections created an entitlement 
that food quality would not diminish as a form of punishment.145  The Court 
agreed and explained that the wording of the administrative code left no 
room for doubt.146 
B. LeMaire v. Maass 
One of the most frequently cited cases on nutraloaf is the 1993 case of 
LeMaire v. Maass.147  In LeMaire, an inmate sued the Superintendent of the 
Oregon prison, alleging that he suffered cruel and unusual punishment 
during his time in a disciplinary segregation unit.148  LeMaire was first sent 
to disciplinary segregation after attacking a prison guard in February of 
1986, and then just ten days after being transferred back into the general 
population, he savagely attacked and attempted to kill a fellow inmate with a 
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ten to twelve inch sharpened, black rod. 149  Based on his record, 
Superintendent Maass concluded that “LeMaire represents a serious threat to 
the safety and well-being of others within the Oregon State Penitentiary.”150 
LeMaire had more than twenty-five violations at the time he complained that 
six practices of the disciplinary segregation unit constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment. 151   In particular, LeMaire challenged Oregon 
Administrative Rule 291-83-015(1), and the use of nutraloaf to combat food 
violations.152 
In its analysis, the court applied the two part subjective and objective test 
from Wilson. 153   The court noted the security constraints that the 
Superintendent faced, and clearly articulated that there must be some level 
of wantonness established for the inmate to prevail.154  With respect to the 
inmate’s placement on a controlled feeding of nutraloaf, the court overruled 
the district court’s determination that nutraloaf was unconstitutional largely 
because it found that the objective prong in Wilson was not satisfied.155  
Specifically, the court reiterated that the Eighth Amendment simply requires 
food that is adequate to maintain health, and that “it need not be tasty or 
aesthetically pleasing.”156  However, the court distinguished the 1978 case of 
Hutto v. Finney by noting that in that case the food substance “grue” [sic] 
only provided 1000 calories a day, whereas in this case nutraloaf provides 
“an excess of nutritional requirements . . . and LeMaire, unlike the Hutto 
inmates who lost weight, has actually gained some sixty pounds in 
confinement.”157  Whether or not weight gain is an indication of nutritional 
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quality is up for debate, nevertheless the court was convinced that LeMaire 
was not being starved.158 
Most importantly, the Court articulated that the use of nutraloaf is not 
“incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.’”159  In particular, the court emphasized that 
any routine discomfort from nutraloaf does not amount to a denial of 
minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities, and so it falls short of an 
Eighth Amendment violation.160 In dictum, the court went on to say that 
even if the serving of nutraloaf met the objective prong, LeMaire also failed 
to show that any prison officials had the sufficiently culpable state of mind 
required to satisfy the subjective prong.161 
C. Prude v. Clarke 
In Prude v. Clarke, a Seventh Circuit case from 2012, a plaintiff brought a 
civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the staff of the Milwaukee 
County Jail based on several visits where he was exclusively fed 
nutraloaf.162 As the court noted, “[o]n the second and third stays . . . the jail 
fed him only ‘nutriloaf,’ pursuant to a new policy the jail had adopted of 
making nutraloaf the exclusive diet of prisoners who had been in segregation 
in prison at the time of their transfer to the jail.”  During his third stay, the 
plaintiff had been fed nutraloaf for two days and “began vomiting his meals 
and experiencing stomach pains and constipation.”163 After deciding not to 
eat the nutraloaf provided, the plaintiff relied on meals of bread and water 
for the remaining eight days he was at the jail, although as the court notes, 
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“it’s unclear how he obtained the bread.”164  As a result, the plaintiff lost 
fourteen pounds after his second and third stays, a total of 8.3 percent of his 
weight.165    To combat his vomiting, a guard sent the plaintiff to the 
infirmary where a nurse provided him with stool softener and antacids.166  
However, once the plaintiff transferred back to state prison “he continued 
experiencing painful defecation and bloody stools . . . and he was diagnosed 
with an anal fissure.”167 
In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants submitted what 
Judge Posner referred to as a “preposterous affidavit” in which a sheriff’s 
officer matter-of-factly stated that “[n]utraloaf has been determined to be a 
nutritious substance for regular meals.” 168   In addition, Judge Posner 
determined that “[n]o evidence was presented concerning the recipe for or 
ingredients of the nutraloaf that was served at the county jail during the 
plaintiff’s sojourns there.”169  In fact, “the recipe was among the items of 
information that the plaintiff sought in discovery” and was never 
produced.170 Judge Posner chastised the defendant prison officials for their 
failure to file a brief as well as their failure to respond to a court order to 
show cause regarding the failure.171 
Ultimately, Judge Posner found that any “deliberate withholding of 
nutritious food or substitution of tainted or otherwise sickening food, with 
the effect of causing substantial weight loss, vomiting, stomach pains, and 
maybe an anal fissure . . . or other severe hardship would violate the Eighth 
Amendment.”172  Judge Posner was careful to note that not all nutraloaf is 
“unhealthful, though all is reputed to have an unpleasant taste.”173  Instead, 
the key factor was that “other prisoners in the jail also vomited after eating 
the nutraloaf, and this suggests that it was indeed inedible.”174  Since the 
defendants submitted no evidence suggesting otherwise, Judge Posner found 
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that it was a possible inference that “jail officials were aware that the 
nutraloaf [was] being fed [to] the prisoners” and that the nutraloaf was 
making the plaintiff sick, but the officials did nothing about it.175  For Judge 
Posner, the lack of response would amount to “deliberate indifference [to] a 
serious health problem and thus an Eighth Amendment claim.”176 
D. Criticism of Prude v. Clarke 
Aside from the obvious fact that Judge Posner was irritated with the 
prison officials for their failure to comply with the judicial process, there are 
still troubling aspects to the decision in Prude v. Clarke.177  In keeping with 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wilson v. Seiter, Eighth Amendment claims 
have to be supported by proof of an objective and a subjective component.178  
Judge Posner, however, merely focused on deliberate indifference, 
specifically whether the agents of the state were somehow culpable in 
permitting nutraloaf to make the plaintiff sick without doing anything in 
response.179  However, a closer examination of the existing record makes it 
clear that the jail officials did in fact do something. 180   Judge Posner 
acknowledges that the plaintiff “tried to solve the problem by speaking with 
a [correctional officer]” and that after his second complaint he was “taken to 
the clinical office to be seen by a nurse.”181  By definition, doing nothing 
would amount to being non-responsive and indifferent to the inmate’s 
requests for help.  Nevertheless, the nurse at the facility provided the 
plaintiff with antacids and stool softener, which by definition also amounts 
to providing the plaintiff with a reasonable remedy to his medical 
concerns.182 
Moreover, Judge Posner relies on the questionable assumption that 
“[a]dult vomiting other than because of illness or drunkenness is rare—
healthy, sober adults do not vomit a meal just because it doesn’t taste 
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good—and if the plaintiff is being truthful there was a veritable epidemic of 
vomiting during his stay.”183  However, this line of thinking is problematic 
as it places too much weight on the credibility of prisoner’s testimony and 
biased recollection.  There is simply no evidence, other than the plaintiff’s 
own testimony that the nurse he visited found his weight loss “alarming,” 
and that other inmates were similarly vomiting from the nutraloaf. 184  
Moreover, without the actual recipe there is simply no evidence to suggest 
that the nutraloaf was not nutritious or was tainted.  Likewise, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the plaintiff was not somehow idiosyncratic, 
perhaps allergic to some of the food product in the loaf, or suffering from 
some sort of ailment that would cause him to regurgitate his meals.185 
The most problematic aspect of the decision is that both prongs of the 
analysis set forth by the Wilson Court were not met to determine whether 
feeding prisoners nutraloaf was in fact cruel and unusual punishment.  First, 
there is nothing in the record that suggests the nutraloaf was actually a form 
of punishment, since it was distributed to all inmates regardless of their 
behavior and not as a deterrent.186  Furthermore, as the prisoner in question 
was actually sent to the infirmary where he was seen by a nurse, there is 
nothing to suggest that the prison officials were nonresponsive or indifferent 
to his alleged claims, especially when efforts were clearly made by staff to 
remedy any health concerns.187   More importantly, there is simply no 
objective prong analysis that shows exactly how or why the conditions of the 
nutraloaf served by the Milwaukee County Jail were objectively cruel and 
unusual.188  Assuming that the food was nutritious in its total caloric value, 
there appears to be no evidence, including further lawsuits by similarly 
situated inmates, to corroborate this particular inmate’s story.  If legitimate, 
there would have been systemic, massive illness throughout the Milwaukee 
County Jail, yet these claims are unsubstantiated. In the same breath that 
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Judge Posner criticizes the Sheriff’s lack of expertise on the nutritional 
quality of nutraloaf and dismisses his opinions as hearsay, he assumes the 
role of pseudo-expert himself and relies on the plaintiff’s own hearsay as 
irrefutable fact.  Given the unusual circumstance that the defendants failed to 
respond in this case, the plaintiff’s claims remained uncontested. 
Nevertheless, this failure to respond does not necessarily ensure the 
legitimacy of any claims or speak to the validity of the conditions at the 
time.  It would appear that Judge Posner’s distaste for the manner in which 
the defendant prison staff handled the inmate’s lawsuit trumped what should 
have been his impartial objectivity. What would have resulted if the prison 
staff had complied with the process can therefore only be one of supposition. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In Rhodes, discussed supra Section III Part A, Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence wisely noted that judicial opinions about cruel and unusual 
punishment do not make for pleasant reading given their subject matter.189  
At the time Rhodes was decided “[t]here [were] over 8,000 pending cases 
filed by inmates challenging prison conditions.”190  Among other things, the 
Rhodes Court noted instances where approximately 200 men were required 
to share the use of one toilet, times when cells were infested with insects, 
and where food was “unappetizing and unwholesome.” 191  While 
circumstances are often difficult to read, the relevant question for this Note 
is whether they constitute cruel and unusual treatment. 
With respect to nutraloaf specifically, so long as the minimum amount of 
calories are provided to inmates, there should not be any constitutional 
violations.  The objective prong set forth in Wilson cannot be met absent a 
showing that the nutraloaf is nutritionally deficient.  While some genuine 
concern exists over the precise contents of nutraloaf, so long as prisons are 
clear on what ingredients are used in order to support nutritional claims, 
there should be no problem.  The LeMaire court correctly reinforced the fact 
that meals need not be tasty or aesthetically pleasing so long as minimum 
nutritional standards are met.192 If inmates want choice with respect to food, 
they are permitted to supplement their needs at the commissary with junk 
food. However, for those inmates that choose to threaten or assault prison 
guards or other inmates, there are consequences to pay.  From a practical 
standpoint, most agree that nutraloaf is foul looking and unpleasant to eat, 
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but that does not necessarily make it inedible or cruel.  If an inmate cannot 
eat nutraloaf because it is actually injuring him or her in some demonstrable 
way, then there are legitimate reasons that it should not be distributed.  
However, it is clear from most cases that prisoners are confusing cannot 
physically eat with will not eat when it comes to nutraloaf.  Generally, if 
prisoners act in accordance with the rules of their confinement, then 
nutraloaf will not be served. The Eighth Amendment will, and should, 
protect those who are either being served less than the nutritional 
requirements when it comes to food or food that is physically harmful, but 
inmates cannot break the rules and subsequently cry foul solely based on 
unappealing and unappetizing food. 
